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Like Two Peas in a Pod? The Functioning of the Early Warning Mechanism in the Czech 
Republic and Poland 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the functioning of the Early Warning System in two EU member states 
belonging to the Visegrád Group: Poland and the Czech Republic. These member states are 
similar along many relevant dimensions but exhibit significant differences in their activities 
within the EWM. Along the model of studying ‘most similar cases’ a detailed comparison thus 
offers insights into what the cause behind these differences in their activity may be.
1
 The 
similarities are extensive. Both member states acceded to the EU in 2004 and their parliamentary 
systems follow the same model of asymmetric bicameralism. Moreover, both apply to a large 
extent centralized scrutiny for the EWM with some role for standing committees. However, in 
terms of outcomes differences are stark. The Polish parliament belongs to the most active group 
of parliaments under the EWM and is much less involved in the Barroso initiative, whilst the 
Czech parliament has barely taken part in the EWM, but its Senát is one of the most active 
parliaments in the political dialogue process. The aim of this chapter is to analyze possible 
reasons for their different approaches to the subsidiarity scrutiny through careful study of the 
details of debates and votes on reasoned opinions and the text of those reasoned opinions 
themselves. 
The chapter first describes the general position of the Polish and the Czech parliaments within 
their constitutional systems. The second section presents procedures implemented in Poland and 
the Czech Republic to accommodate the EWM. Next, the chapter explores the reasoned opinions 
and discusses the issues that the chambers criticize: subsidiarity, legal basis, proportionality, 
delegations to the Commission to adopt non-legislative acts, fundamental rights protection and 
contents of the proposals. Moreover, the chapter analyses the debates and votes taken under the 
EWM. The aim is to establish whether the parliamentary chambers gained some independence 
from their national government under the EWM and whether reasoned opinions integrate the 
whole political spectrum at the national level. The chapter concludes with an exploration to 
explain the differences in the functioning of the EWM in each of the member states under 
analysis. 
Position of parliament in the constitutional system of Poland and the Czech Republic 
The Polish constitution vests legislative power in two chambers of the parliament: the Sejm and 
the Senat, both elected for a four-year term of office.
2
 The Sejm is composed of 460 Deputies 
                                                 
1
 R Hirschl, ‘The question of case selection in Comparative Constitutional Law’ 53 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (2005) 125, 134. 
2
 Art 95(1) of the Polish Constitution. 
 2 
who are elected in universal, equal, direct and proportional elections by secret ballot.
3
 The Senat, 
re-established after the fall of communism in 1989, consists of 100 Senators who are chosen in 
universal and direct elections by secret ballot.
4
 After a 2011 reform, Senators are chosen in 
majority elections, held in single-member constituencies.
5
 Only the lower chamber, the Sejm, 
exercises control over the Council of Ministers, has the power to overturn by an absolute 
majority the Senat’s rejection of a bill or amendments proposed to it and adopts the state’s 
budget.
6
 Moreover, the Sejm may overturn a presidential veto.
7
 The Sejm and the Senat however 
share some functions such as initiating the legislative process and the constitutional amendment 
process.
8
 The Polish bicameralism is hence described as unequal or incomplete, the Senat being 
regarded a chamber of reflection.
9
 
Since 2007, in the period relevant for the EWM analysis, the governing coalition consisted of the 
liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO) and the centrist Polish People’s Party (PSL), a force 
reflected in the composition of the Sejm and Senat. The opposition included the conservative 
Law and Justice (PiS), liberal Palikot’s Movement (RP), social-democratic Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) and right-wing United Poland (SP).
10
  
Similarly to Poland, the Czech bicameral system consists of the Poslanecká sněmovna and the 
Senát which was established in 1992 after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.
11
 The Poslanecká 
sněmovna consists of 200 deputies chosen for a four year term in universal, equal, proportional 
and direct elections by secret ballot.
12
 In the Senát 81 Senators are elected for a term of six years, 
with one third of the Senators renewed every two years in universal, equal and direct elections by 
secret ballot and under the principles of the majority system.
13
 The Czech bicameralism is also 
an asymmetrical one: while both chambers may put forward legislative proposals,
14
 the 
government is accountable only to the Poslanecká sněmovna, which also has a final say (by 
absolute majority) within the legislative procedure and with regard to the presidential veto of 
bills and it approves the state’s budget.15  
Although the Social Democrats (ČSSD) gained the largest number of seats in the 2010 elections 
to the Poslanecká sněmovna, between July 2010 October 2013 the conservative Civic 
Democratic Party (ODS), TOP 09 and populist Public Affairs (VV) formed the government. 
                                                 
3
 Art 96 of the Polish Constitution. 
4
 Art 97 of the Polish Constitution. 
5
 Art 260 §1 Ustawa z 5 stycznia 2011 r. – Kodeks wyborczy, Dz.U. 2011 nr 21 poz. 112 (Election Code). 
6
 Art 95(2), Art. 121(3) and Art. 219(1) of the Polish Constitution. 
7
 Art 122(5) of the Polish Constitution. 
8
 Art 119(1) and Art 235(1) of the Polish Constitution.  
9
 L Garlicki, Polskie Prawo Konstytucyjne: Zarys Wykadu (Liber 2006) at 199.  
10
 Ruch Palikota and SLD have no representatives in the Senat, similar as in the period of 2007-2011. 
11
 Art 15(2) of the Czech Constitution. 
12
 Art 16(1) and Art 18(1) of the Czech Constitution. 
13
 Art 16(2) and Art 18(2) of the Czech Constitution. 
14
 Art 41(2) of the Czech Constitution. 
15
 Art 68(1), Art 47(1), Art 50(2) and Art 42(1) of the Czech Constitution. 
 3 
Since October 2013 elections the Social Democrats are in the center-left governing coalition 
together with populist ANO 2011 and centrist Christian and Democratic Union (KDU–ČSL). In 
October 2010 the Social Democrats gained a majority in the Senát, traditionally dominated by 
Civic Democrats. Subsequent elections in October 2012 and 2014 further enhanced the majority 
of Social Democrats in the Senát. 
EWM procedures 
In this section, I explore the institutional design concerning subsidiarity scrutiny in Poland and 
the Czech Republic. The Lisbon Treaty by granting new competences to national parliaments has 
in fact equalised the unequal bicameralism in both member states, since both Senates gained 
equal rights under the EWM and this was also translated to national provisions.
16
 
Poland 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, it was argued that despite its relatively strong position vis-à-vis the 
government in the constitutional system, in EU affairs the parliament was ‘more an accidental 
hero than an effective actor.’17 The early involvement of the parliament in EU affairs related to 
the approximation of national law to EU law prior to Poland’s accession to the EU.18 After EU 
accession, the parliament adopted the Act on Cooperation between the Council of Ministers and 
Parliament in EU affairs granting the parliament powers with regard to aspects such as 
cooperation in the EU legislative process, adoption of laws implementing EU law and 
appointments to EU institutions.
19
 Also in 2005, whilst controlling the compatibility with the 
Constitution of the Act on Cooperation, the Constitutional Court underlined the necessity to 
ensure that both the Sejm and the Senat participate in the process of EU law drafting.
20
  
                                                 
16
 On this conclusion for the Polish parliament see Z Witkowski, M Serowaniec, ‘Przesłanki naruszenia zasady 
pomocniczości przez akty ustawodawcze Unii Europejskiej w świetle uzasadnionych opiniii przyjętych przez Sejm i 
Senat RP’ 31 Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze (2014) 997, 1001. 
17
 A Łazowski, ‘The Polish Parliament and EU affairs. An effective actor or an accidental hero?’ in J O’Brennan and 
T Raunio (eds.) National Parliaments within the enlarged European Union. From ‘victims’ of Integration to 
Competitive Actors (Routledge 2007) at 203.  
18
 ibid at 204ff. 
19 Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2004 r. o współpracy Rady Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach związanych z 
członkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej, Dz.U. Nr 52, poz. 515 oraz z 2005 r. Nr 11, poz. 89 i 
Nr 160, poz. 1342. 
20
 Trybunał Konstytucyjny, K 24/04 judgment of 12.01.2005, inequality in competences of Sejm and Senat 
committees in respect of European Union legislative proposal. The Court stated that influencing the position of the 
government is in fact a legislative function. As long as the bi-cameral parliament is to be maintained, both chambers 
should be guaranteed equal participation in activities concerning the shaping position of Poland in the field of 
adopting EU law. See A Łazowski, ‘The Polish parliament and EU affairs: an effective actor or an accidental hero?’ 
in J O'Brennan and T Raunio (eds), National parliaments within the enlarged European Union: from'victims' of 
integration to competitive actors? (Routledge 2007) at 212-214. 
 4 
The new powers of the parliament in EU affairs significantly strengthened its impact on the 
government’s policy making.21 Other activities of the Polish parliament in that period included 
debates of EU related issues and resolutions in this respect, as well as engagement in 
interparliamentary cooperation.
22
 However, observers criticised the early years of the Polish 
parliament in the EU for the quite limited expertise and understanding of EU law by the deputies 
and the political reality of parliamentary work.
23
 The position of parliament in EU affairs was 
described as ‘modest’ as understood in the categories developed by Maurer and Wessels and a 
‘cooperative model’ in which the parliament’s position cannot be forced on the government.24  
In the judgment assessing the Lisbon Treaty the Polish Constitutional Court stressed the 
significance of national parliaments in issuing reasoned opinions on Commission proposals 
allowing the Polish parliament to shape the content of EU law ‘to the extent (…) that it is 
possible to narrow down the scope of its “external character” in relation to the Polish state.’25 In 
this respect, the Constitutional Court left it to the legislature to take the legal measures to 
accommodate the EWM and shape the cooperation of the government with the Sejm and the 
Senat in EU affairs.
26
 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Polish parliament 
gained a number of new powers which are reflected in the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm
27
 and 
the Senat
28
 and in the new Cooperation Act (2010), however its role in EU affairs has not 
radically changed from the national perspective.
29
   
The question of subsidiarity scrutiny of Commission proposals was not completely new for the 
Polish parliament because it assessed subsidiarity while opining Commission proposals for the 
Polish government.
30
 Since the Lisbon Treaty, of course, the chambers may send a reasoned 
opinion to the Commission. In this regard, the lower chamber applies the centralized model in 
which the European Affairs Committee (EAC) remains the main actor,
31
 whereas the upper 
                                                 
21
 J Barcz and A Pudło, ‘The Polish Parliament and EU Affairs’ in C Hefftler, Ch Neuhold, O Rozenberg, J Smith 
(eds) The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union (Palgrave 2015) at 605. 
22
 Łazowski n 17 at 211. 
23
 ibid at 215 
24
 Barcz and Pudło n 21 at 608. 
25
 Trybunał Konstytucyjny, K 32/09 judgment of 24 November 2010, p. 31. The Court, following the Polish 
doctrine, sees EU law as an order that is ‘partially external’ to Polish law meaning that although EU legal acts have 
a legal force in Poland it is not the Polish legislator who creates EU law. 
26
 ibid. 
27
 Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 30 lipca 1992 r., Regulamin Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 
M.P. 1992 nr 26 poz. 185. (Sejm Rules of Procedure) 
28
 Uchwała Senatu z dnia 23 listopada 1990 r., Regulamin Senatu, M.P. 1991 nr 2 poz. 11. For the description of 
new powers see also Barcz and Pudło n 21. 
29
 Barcz and Pudło n 21 at 608. 
30
 A Fuksiewicz, ‘Sejm i Senat rok po wejściu w życie Traktatu Lizbońskiego-dostosowanie do reformy 
instytucjonalnej’ <http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/pdf/1827766553.pdf> at 11. 
31
 However, see the written evidence from the EU Affairs Committee of the Polish Sejm to the House of Lords, 
which pointed out that the Sejm’s standing committees are now more involved in scrutiny work and that joint 
meetings between the EU affairs committee and standing committees are sometimes held. House of Lords, European 
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chamber uses a mixed one, where the EAC and standing committees cooperate on expressing a 
reasoned opinion. This section hence presents the centralized subsidiarity scrutiny of the EAC of 
the Sejm and mixed system of the Senat.
32
 The Cooperation Act and the Rules of Procedure of 
each of the chambers regulate the subsidiarity review in the Polish parliament. 
In the Sejm, the Marshall forwards EU draft legislative acts to the EAC of the Sejm.
33
 Usually 
once per week, the Presidium of the EAC, on the basis of the Sejm’s Bureau of Research 
analysis, choses proposals for further consideration and assigns rapporteurs to them.
34
 Next, the 
EAC itself or a group of fifteen MPs can take a resolution with a reasoned opinion attached to a 
motion stating the grounds.
35
 The first reading of this resolution takes place in the EAC while the 
second one at a plenary session of the Sejm.
36
 If the Sejm adopts the reasoned opinion, the 
Marshall of the Sejm forwards the resolution to the Commission.
37
  
In the Senat, the Marshall forwards all EU documents to the EAC and to the standing 
committees, if requested so by the chairman of the EAC.
38
 In the EAC the chairman and the two 
Deputy Chairs sift the EU draft legislative acts prior to the committee sitting and assign 
rapporteurs for documents selected for debate in the committee.
39
 If the EAC or any standing 
committee adopts an opinion that EU draft legislative act violates the subsidiarity principle, it 
next puts a motion to the Marshall of the Senat for a resolution of the Senat together with the 
draft opinion.
40
 This draft opinion is forwarded to all relevant committees, including the EAC.
41
 
They should prepare a joint report that is later voted in the plenary sitting of the Senat.
42
  
The Cooperation Act of 2010 compels the government to cooperate with the Sejm and the Senat 
in ‘affairs connected to the membership in the EU.’43 Specifically, the Council of Ministers must 
                                                                                                                                                             
Affairs Committee, 9th Report of Session 2013–14, The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 
published 24 March 2014, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldeucom/151/151.pdf at 13. 
32
 The Senat’s system represents a mixed system of the participation of the dominating EAC with a prior facultative 
consultation of the standing committees. For the possible constellations of the mixed systems see K Granat, National 
Parliaments and the Policing of the Subsidiarity Principle (EUI PhD 2014). 
33
 Art 148b(1)(4) Sejm Rules of Procedure.  
34
 See http://oide.sejm.gov.pl/oide/en/images/files/badanie_pomocniczosci/subsidiarity_sejm_table_pl.pdf. 
35
 Art 148cc(1)(2) Sejm Rules of Procedure. 
36
 Art 148cc(3) Sejm Rules of Procedure. 
37
 Art 148cc(5) Sejm Rules of Procedure. 
38
 Art 75a Senat Rules of Procedure. 
39
 See http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/parliaments/institution/plsen.do. 
40
 Art 75d(1) Senat Rules of Procedure.  
41
 Art 75d(2) Senat Rules of Procedure 
42
 See at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/parliaments/institution/plsen.do. Also as pointed out by the Vice-Chair of 
the EAC of the Senat, in the recent years, the specialised committees are more involved in EU issues. See House of 
Lords, The Select Committee on the European Union Inquiry on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU, 
Unrevised Transcript of Evidence, Session No 4, 19.10.2013, Q52. 
43 Ustawa z dnia 8 października 2010 r. o współpracy Rady Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach związanych 
z członkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej, Dz. U. Nr 213 Poz. 1395 (Cooperation Act). See 
Art 1 and 2 Cooperation Act. 
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forward an opinion on EU draft legislative acts within fourteen days after receipt thereof.
44
 This 
opinion should include an assessment whether the EU proposal is compatible with the 
subsidiarity principle.
45
 
The Czech Republic 
Before the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU, in 2001, the Czech Constitution was amended 
to incorporate provisions on the relationship between government and parliament in EU affairs, 
including the duty to inform parliament and the possibility to express its views by parliament.
46
 
The amendment together with new provisions in the Rules of Procedure of each of the chambers 
reflected the political willingness for more involvement of the Czech parliament in EU affairs 
after the Czech EU accession.
47
 The position of the Poslanecká sněmovna at that time was 
assessed as being of a medium strength vis-à-vis the government, while the Senát was more 
modest since the government was not bound by Senát’s opinions during the negotiations at EU 
level.
48
  
The following changes in the Rules of Procedure of the Czech chambers were connected to the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
49
 They included the introduction of the EWM procedures 
and the ‘mandating’ rights of the parliament with regard to the flexibility clause, passerelle 
clauses and the simplified revision procedure.
50
 The Czech Constitutional Court highlighted 
these changes in its Lisbon Treaty judgment and underlined that ‘national parliaments of member 
states can play an important role in protecting the limits of competences which the member states 
conferred on the Union’ since they were granted a role in this process in accordance with 
Protocol No 1 and No 2.
51
  
The Rules of Procedure describe the practices applicable to subsidiarity review which are rather 
centralised systems of scrutiny in the EAC, with some characteristics of a mixed scrutiny since 
also the standing committees are consulted.
52
 In the Poslanecká sněmovna, the Parliamentary 
                                                 
44
 Art 7 (1) Cooperation Act. 
45
 Art 7 (3)(3) Cooperation Act. 
46
 Art 10 b of the Czech Constitution. 
47
 L Pitrová and M Coxová, ‘Parliamentary Control of EU Decision-making in the Czech Republic’ in O Tans, C 
Zoethout, J Peters (eds), National Parliaments and European Democracy. A Bottom-up Approach to European 
Constitutionalism (Europa Law Publishing 2007) at 207. 
48
 ibid at 215. 
49
 So-called ‘Lisbon Amendment’ to the Act on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies and of the 
Senate of the Czech Republic (Act No. 162/2009 Col.). 
50
 See M Hrabálek and A Strelkov, ‘The Czech Parliament and European Integration’ in C Hefftler, Ch Neuhold, O 
Rozenberg, J Smith (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union (Palgrave 
2015) at 501.  
51
 Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 19/08: Treaty of Lisbon I, para. 140. 
52
 See however that other authors identify the Czech system as centralised: 
http://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/sites/www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/files/news_items/engaging_with_europe
_management_report_2nd_edition.pdf. The Czech scrutiny system is similar to that of the Polish Senat; although it 
is dominated by the EAC, the standing committees might also be consulted. See also Granat n 32. 
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Institute proposes documents for scrutiny and the chair of the EAC does the final selection.
53
 For 
the selected document, the government submits its opinion to the EAC that is next a basis for 
deliberation in the committee.
54
 The EAC can also forward the draft EU act to a standing 
committee.
55
 An expert of EU Unit prepares for the rapporteur an analysis of the scrutinised 
proposal.
56
 The rapporteur together with the expert draft a resolution on the proposal, which 
includes a reasoned opinion.
57
 On the basis of the obtained information, the EAC can take a 
resolution on issuing a reasoned opinion that counts as an opinion of the whole chamber if not 
sent for the approval to the plenary.
58
 The reasoned opinion is then sent by the president of the 
chamber to the government, the Senát and to EU institutions.
59
  
In the Senát, the EAC chairman together with the Head of the EU Unit and the committee’s 
advisor select EU documents for scrutiny from the weekly overview prepared by that Unit and 
appoints a rapporteur for the chosen piece of legislation.
60
 The EAC may request information on 
the proposal at stake from the government within 14 days.
61
 In addition the EAC may ask a 
standing committee to submit its opinion on the proposal under consideration within an agreed 
time limit.
62
 The member of the EU Unit prepares an analysis for the EAC.
63
 The Committee 
rapporteur assisted by the advisor to the Committee and expert from EU Unit drafts a resolution 
on the proposal incorporating a subsidiarity assessment; if a breach is confirmed a reasoned 
opinion is prepared.
64
 Having obtained the draft resolution, the EAC decides either only to take 
note of the proposal or to refer it to the plenary not later than three days before the elapse of the 
eight-week deadline set by Protocol No.2.
65
 If approved, the President of the Senát forwards the 
reasoned opinion directly to EU institutions.
66
 
                                                 
53
 Hrabálek and Strelkov n 50 at 496. 
54
 §109a(1) and (2) Rules of Procedure.  
55
 §109a(2) Rules of Procedure. However, the opinion of the standing committee is not binding for the EAC. See 
Hrabálek and Strelkov n 50 at 497. 
56
 Scrutiny of documents coming from the European Union and monitoring compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/parliaments/institution/czpos.do. 
57
 ibid. 
58
 §109a(4) Rules of Procedure.  
59
 §109a(6) Rules of Procedure. 
60
 §119d(1) Standing Rules of the Senát. See also information on the website of the Senát: 
http://www.senat.cz/senat/evropa/vybory_a_plenum/index-eng.php?ke_dni=8.5.2015&O=10. This procedure is not 
exclusively for subsidiarity issues. See ‘Scrutiny of documents coming from the European Union and monitoring 
compliance with the subsidiarity principle’ at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/parliaments/institution/czsen.do. 
61
 §119d(3) Standing Rules of the Senát. 
62
 §119d(4) Standing Rules of the Senát. The involvement of standing committees is higher in the Senát than in the 
chamber. See Hrabálek and Strelkov n 50 at 497. 
63
 See ‘Scrutiny of documents coming from the European Union and monitoring compliance with the subsidiarity 
principle’ at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/parliaments/institution/czsen.do. 
64
 ibid. 
65
 §119f(2) and (3) Standing Rules of the Senát. 
66
 §119i(1) Standing Rules of the Senát. 
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Assessment of the functioning of the EWM by the parliaments 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty until the end of 2014, the parliaments under 
analysis have participated in the EWM and the ‘Barroso initiative’ to a different extent as 
presented in the table below. In addition, the Polish Sejm participated in the first ‘yellow card’ 
on the Monti II proposal,
67
 while the Czech Senát contributed to the second one, on the EPPO 
proposal.
68
 
 Polish Sejm Polish Senat Czech 
Poslanecká 
sněmovna 
Czech Senát  
Reasoned 
opinion 
12 11 3 4 
Opinion under 
Barroso initiative 
10 23 28 219 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of 2010-2014 Commission Annual Reports on Relations between the 
European Commission and National Parliaments. 
Despite the fact that the parliamentary chambers under analysis have been active in the EWM to 
different extents, they share a rather negative assessment of the functioning of the EWM.
69
 The 
chairman of the Senat’s EAC in its evidence to the UK House of Lords noted a set of problems.70 
First, he raised the question of common definition of subsidiarity and its political character, 
which leads to an overly narrow scope of reasoned opinions. Second, the chairman underlined 
that the eight-week deadline to submit a reasoned opinion does not take relevant parliamentary 
breaks such as end of term into account. Third, the lack of common interests of parliaments on 
EU policies was raised as a weakness of the EWM.  
Moreover, the parliaments under comparison negatively assess the Commission’s replies to 
reasoned options. In the view of the Polish Senat’s EAC chairman, the Commission answers with 
a delay and neglects the views of national parliaments.
71
 The views expressed by the Sejm’s 
representative seem compatible with that of the Senat with regard to the impact of the reasoned 
                                                 
67
 Polish Sejm, Reasoned Opinion of 11.05.2012 on COM (2012) 130. 
68
 Czech Senát, Reasoned Opinion of 9.10.2013 on COM (2013) 534. 
69
 See however that the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna labels the EWM a ‘great tool’ for national parliaments Czech 
Poslanecká sněmovna in Annex to the 23rd Bi-annual Report of COSAC at 115. 
70
 Mr Edmund Wittbrodt, Chairman of the European Affairs Committee, Senat, Poland in House of Lords European 
Union Committee Report HL 151 of Session 2013-14, The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 
Written evidence at 312ff.  
71
 ibid. 
 9 
opinions.
72
 In the same vein, the Czech Senát suggests that the Commission should monitor and 
disclose the impact of the EWM on the legislative procedure.
73
  
With a view to improve the functioning of the EWM, in May 2015, preceding the COSAC 
meeting, the Polish Sejm organised a working group meeting with an aim to improve the ‘yellow 
card’ procedure.74 The discussion focused on the involvement and cooperation by national 
parliaments with regard to the Commission Work Programme; inclusion of the proportionality 
principle under the EWM; timing and quality of Commission’s replies and the extension of 
submissions deadline from eight to twelve weeks. 
Finally, the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna and the Senát, as well as the Polish Sejm support the 
introduction of a new ‘green card’, which would build on the existing ‘Barroso initiative’ 
allowing parliaments to make constructive suggestions regarding policy or legislative proposals 
to the Commission without amending the Treaty.
75
  In fact, the Czech Senát supported the first 
‘green card’ on the reduction of food waste within the EU, put forward by 16 other chairpersons 
of committees of national parliaments.
76
 
Reasoned opinions 
This section deals with the content of the reasoned opinions of Czech and Polish parliaments 
with the aim to highlight the questions raised under the EWM. First, the chambers conduct 
subsidiarity scrutiny which consists of two aspects: the material and the procedural dimensions 
of the principle of subsidiarity.
77
 In accordance with Article 5(3) TEU the material dimension of 
subsidiarity might be reviewed in the national insufficiency test and the comparative efficiency 
test by Schütze. Under the first test the Union shall act ‘only if and in so far as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States’ which means that a 
Member State has ‘inadequate means at its disposal for achieving the objectives of the proposed 
action.’78 The second test permits the Union to act when the objectives of the proposed action 
                                                 
72
 Mr Andrzej Gałażewski, Vice Chairman of European Union Affairs Committee, Sejm, Poland in House of Lords 
European Union Committee Report HL 151 of Session 2013-14, The Role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union, Written evidence at 310. 
73
 Mr Miroslav Krejča, Chairman of the Committee on European Affairs, The Senát, Parliament of Czech Republic 
in House of Lords European Union Committee Report HL 151 of Session 2013-14, The Role of National 
Parliaments in the European Union, Written evidence at 105. 
74
 See http://oide.sejm.gov.pl/oide/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14900&Itemid=946. 
75
 Annex to the 23
rd
 Bi-annual Report of COSAC at 115, 128, 451 (no reply from the Polish Senat). See also chapter 
by Hettne in this Volume. 
76
 220
th
 Resolution of the Czech Senát of 12.08.2015, on the joint letter of members of parliaments of EU member 
states to the European Commission (so-called “green card”) on food waste. For the proposal see the joint letter of 
22.07.2015 from the members of parliamentary committees to the President of the Commission available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-select/green-card/green-card-on-food-waste.pdf. 
77
 A Estella De Noriega, The EU principle of subsidiarity and its critique (Oxford University Press 2002) at 105.  
78
 K Lenaerts, ‘Subsidiarity and Community competence in the field of education’ 1 Columbia Journal of European 
Law (1994) 22. 
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can rather ‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union 
level.’ To put it differently, the EU should not act ‘unless it could better achieve the objectives of 
the proposed action.’79  
In response to a Commission proposal regarding the management of copyrights in musical 
works, the Polish Sejm in its material subsidiarity control put forward that the Member States 
themselves may achieve the objective of transparent management within the EU internal market, 
as it is already happening in Poland and the Commission did not prove that EU action in this 
respect would be more effective.
80
 Subsidiarity is similarly understood in the lower Czech 
chamber, which argued with regard to the Commission proposal for the third-country seasonal 
workers directive that seasonal work can be dealt with by existing legislation and an EU action 
has no added value.
81
 In the understanding of the Polish Senat the subsidiarity principle can be 
breached when a proposal does not contain a supranational element and there is no need for 
harmonization.
82
 In some cases, the chambers assess only the fulfilment of the national 
insufficiency test. For example, the Czech Senát indicated with regard to the Commission 
proposal initiating the Eurojust reforms that the current systems of member states could be 
improved leading to a better functioning of the regulation already in place.
83
  
In addition, the substantive assessment of the subsidiarity principle was followed by the 
procedural scrutiny connected with the ‘onus to justify’ legislative proposals which rests on EU 
institutions.
84
 Specifically, national legislatures check whether the Commission has justified the 
compatibility of proposed legislation with the subsidiarity principle.
85
 The Czech Senát and to a 
large extent the Polish chambers found this type of subsidiarity breach in a number of 
proposals.
86
 For example the Czech Senát opined that the Commission did not substantiate the 
proposed Eurojust reforms from the perspective of their compliance with the subsidiarity 
principle.
87
          
                                                 
79
 R Schütze, From dual to cooperative federalism: the changing structure of European law (Oxford University 
Press 2009) at 250. 
80
 Polish Sejm, Reasoned Opinion of 12.10.2012 on COM (2012) 372.  
81
 Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, Reasoned Opinion of 7.10.2010 on COM (2010) 379. For the Czech Senát see 
Reasoned Opinion of 9.10.2013 on COM (2013) 534. 
82
 See Polish Senat, Reasoned Opinion of 21.10.2010 on COM (2010) 379. 
83
 Czech Senát, Reasoned Opinion of 9.10.2013 on COM (2013) 535. 
84
 G De Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’ Harvard Jean Monnet working paper 
series <http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/99/990701.html>, 8. 
85
 See X Groussot and S Bogojević, ‘Subsidiarity as a Procedural Safeguard of Federalism’ in L Azoulai (ed), The 
question of competence in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2014) at 235. 
86
 See Sejm Reasoned Opinion of 12.10.2012 on COM (2012) 372 and Sejm Reasoned Opinion of 13.01.2012 on 
COM (2011) 560. See also in Sejm Reasoned Opinion of 25.11.2010 on COM (2010) 537 and also in Sejm 
Reasoned Opinion of 25.11.2010 on COM (2010) 539, Sejm Reasoned Opinion of 4.03.2011 on COM (2010) 799; 
Sejm Reasoned Opinion of 3.02.2011 on COM (2010) 728, Polish Senat Reasoned Opinion of 9.01.2013 on COM 
(2013) 614.  
87
 Czech Senát, Reasoned Opinion of 9.10.2013 on COM (2013) 535.  
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The reasoned opinions of the Polish and Czech chambers focus on a number of relevant issues in 
the Commission proposals, going beyond the assessment of the subsidiarity principle. While the 
question on whether national parliaments should apply a broad scrutiny of Commission 
proposals that steps beyond their competence to monitor subsidiarity compliance indicated in 
Protocol No. 2 is currently under discussion in national parliaments and EU legal scholarship 
alike, for descriptive purposes the issues raised by the Czech and Polish parliaments in their 
reasoned opinions are discussed below.
88
 These include the evaluation by the chambers under 
analysis of the legal basis and proportionality of Commission proposals as well as criticism of 
delegations of executive powers upon the Commission and the standards of protection of 
fundamental rights included in the Commission proposals (Czech chambers exclusively).
89
  
The assessment of the legal basis of Commission proposals is connected with the close links of 
the principle of conferral to the principle of subsidiarity, both anchored in Article 5 TEU.
90
 It is 
argued that ‘if the Union already fails the competence test, a subsidiarity test even if conducted 
cannot possibly be positive.’91 Within the Czech and Polish legislatures under analysis, the 
reasoned opinions of the Polish Sejm exemplify such scrutiny. For example, in its reasoned 
opinion on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base stated that the EU lacks competence 
of direct taxation and the proposal was wrongly based on Article 115 TFEU.
92
 Hence, in the 
view of the Sejm, ‘exceeding competences conferred on the Union must be considered an 
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity.’93 The chamber drew a similar conclusion in the 
case of the Commission proposal establishing an EU legal framework for determining 
jurisdiction and the law applicable to the property consequences of registered partnerships stating 
that the issue at stake belongs to the area of substantive family law and would, as a result, 
                                                 
88
 See Twenty-third Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to 
Parliamentary Scrutiny (6.05.2015) at 29 ff; Folketing, European Affairs Committee, 23 Recommendations to 
strengthen national parliaments in the changing European governance  (January 2015); F Fabbrini and K Granat, 
‘Yellow Card, but No Foul’: The Role of the National Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the 
Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike’, 50 CML Rev (2013) 115; M Goldoni, ‘The 
Early Warning System and the Monti II Regulation: The Case for a Political Interpretation’, 9 European 
Constitutional Law Review (2014)  98; M Bartl, ‘The Way We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and the Substantive 
Democratic Deficit’ 21 European Law Journal (2015) 23. 
89
 For a detailed analysis of the content of the reasoned opinions of the Polish parliament see also C Mik, K Kuszel, 
M Zreda, ‘Parlamenty narodowe wobec zasady pomocniczości w świetle prawa i praktyki Unii Europejskiej’, BAS, 
Prace Studialne, nr 18/12/2014 at 95 available at 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/WydBAS.nsf/0/DA2934F5B0C605DBC1257DB200459923/$file/Parlamenty_wobec_pomo
cniczosci.pdf. 
90
 P Craig, EU administrative law (Oxford University Press 2010) at 40. 
91
 Ph Kiiver, The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity: Constitutional theory and empirical reality 
(Palgrave 2012) at 99. In contrast Judge Thomas Von Danwitz concludes that subsidiarity cannot settle the question 
of competence, even though that question might be related to the more general idea of subsidiarity. See T von 
Danwitz, ‘Subsidiaritätskontrolle in der Europäischen Union’ in K Hansmann K-P Dolde, S Paetow, E Schmidt-
Assmann (ed), Verfassung-Umwelt-Wirtschaft Festschrift für Dieter Sellner zum 75 Geburtstag (Beck 2010) at 40. 
92
 Polish Sejm, Reasoned Opinion of 13.05.2011 on COM (2011) 121. 
93
 ibid. 
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introduce partnerships to the Polish legal order that currently does not provide for this type of 
institution.
94
  
Third, the compatibility of the Commission proposals with the proportionality principle was a 
crucial issue in some of the reasoned opinions.
95
 Such an assessment requires an evaluation of 
the necessity of a measure, its adequacy to achieve a desired goal and its conciliation with 
competing interests.
96
 Both Polish chambers included an assessment of the proportionality 
principle in their reasoned opinions. Accordingly, the Polish Sejm assessed the Commission 
‘Women on boards’ proposal as being in breach with the proportionality principle, since ‘it 
would suffice to adopt EU-wide measures aimed at standardizing the criteria of appointing 
members of company boards, without the need to establish binding parities.’97 Similarly, the 
Czech Poslanecká sněmovna opined that binding quotas for women on boards are a ‘measure of 
last resort.’98 Moreover, the Polish Senat indicated that the benefits of maritime spatial planning 
and integrated coastal management that one of the Commission proposals obliged member states 
to conduct was ‘disproportionately low’ as compared to their costs from a view point of 
promoting the maritime and costal activities.
99
  In the same vein, the Czech Senát argued that 
fulfilling the objective of increased recycling rates by the Commission proposal on waste 
management is not attainable taking into account its time and costs.
100
  
Next, EU draft legislative acts conferring upon the Commission powers to adopt delegated or 
implementing acts in accordance with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU were a subject of scrutiny in 
reasoned opinions.
101
 Both the Polish chambers and the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna often 
disapprove of such delegations of power to the Commission provided for in the draft legislative 
acts assessed under the EWM.
102
 For example, the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna argued against 
the scale of delegations in the proposed tobacco products directive.
103
 Similarly, the Polish Sejm 
and Senat in a series of reasoned opinions highlighted problems with the delegations of the basic 
draft legislative act. Specifically, they criticised a wide scope of powers delegated on the 
                                                 
94
 Polish Sejm, Reasoned Opinion of 27.05.2011 on COM (2011) 127. See also Polish Sejm, Reasoned Opinion of 
4.01.2013 on COM (2012) 614 and Reasoned Opinion of 10.10.2012 on COM (2012) 369 where it indicates the 
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95
 For relationship between subsidiarity and proportionality principles see A G Toth, ‘The principle of subsidiarity in 
the Maastricht Treaty’ 29 CML Rev (1992) 1079, 1083. 
96
 A Stone Sweet and J Mathews, ‘Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 72. 
97
 Polish Sejm, Reasoned Opinion of 4.01.2013 on COM (2012) 614. 
98
 Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, Reasoned Opinion of 6.12.2912, COM (2012) 614. 
99
 Polish Senat, Reasoned Opinion of 23.04.2013 on COM (2013) 133. 
100
 Czech Senát, Reasoned Opinion of 1.10.2014 on COM (2014) 397. 
101
 R Schütze, ‘‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis’ 74 Modern Law 
Review (2011) 661. 
102
 Such an assessment under the EWS is wide spread under the EWM. See C Moury, A Heritier and K Granat, ‘The 
Contest for Power in Delegated Rule-Making’ in C Bergström and D Ritleng (eds) Law-Making by the EU 
Commission: The New System for Delegation of Powers (OUP 2016 forthcoming). 
103
 Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, Reasoned Opinion of 24.01.2013 on COM (2012) 788, point 2. 
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Commission;
104
 the unclear choice between delegations by means of delegated or implementing 
acts;
105
 the lack of an indication of the objectives, content, scope and duration of delegated 
power;
106
 delegation of regulatory powers with regard to essential elements of the proposal by 
means of delegated acts;
107
 and the subject matters that the Commission aims at tackling by 
means of delegated acts.
108
  
Although fundamental rights have found a prominent position in Article 6 TEU in the EU, 
national parliaments negatively assess their safeguards.
109
 This is especially visible in the 
reasoned opinions of the Czech chambers which raised the question of fundamental rights 
protection offered by Commission proposals. The Czech Senát underlined in its reasoned opinion 
that the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) regulation violates fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Czech constitutional system and by the ECHR (and in the view of the 
chamber, in consequence, violates also the Charter of Fundamental Rights). Especially 
problematic were the right to a lawful judge due to the EPPO’s choice of the competent court 
and the right to fair trial due to single-instance procedures and lack of appeal procedures against 
the EPPO decisions.
110
 In turn the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna argued that the EU might also 
propose standards that are too high. Specifically, the chamber opined that the Commission 
proposal on third country seasonal workers would raise the standard of social rights of the 
workers from third countries beyond that offered to the EU citizens in cases where transitional 
periods apply.
111
  
Finally, in their content the reasoned opinions of the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna are rather 
succinct as compared to the upper chamber’s opinions that contain many more comments on the 
substance of the proposals. The Polish Sejm also offers some general comments on the 
proposals, as for example with regard to the proposal ‘on clinical trials on medicinal products for 
human use’ where the chamber indicated its reservations about the ‘general concept’ of the 
proposal since it concerns ‘matters of strictly national character and of the ethical aspects of the 
clinical trial’.112 
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 Polish Sejm, Reasoned Opinion of 25.11.2010 on COM (2010) 537 and of 4.03.2011 on COM (2010) 799. 
105
 Polish Sejm, Reasoned Opinion of 25.11.2010 on COM (2010) 539.   
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 Polish Sejm, Reasoned Opinion of 10.10.2012 on COM (2012) 369. 
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Debates and votes under the EWM 
This section studies the debates in the parliamentary committees or plenary sessions and the 
voting patterns for all the reasoned opinions issued by the Polish and the Czech parliaments. The 
aim is to uncover whether the respective parliamentary chambers gained some independence 
from their governments under the EWM and whether there is a party division on issuing a 
reasoned opinion.   
Parliament’s independence from Government’s views under the EWM 
The first issue to consider is the extent to which under the EWM the Czech and Polish 
parliamentary chambers act independently from their respective governments. This challenge is 
based on the assumption that it is rather improbable that a national parliament’s majority would 
take a different position from that of the government on the issue of subsidiarity.
113
 The analysis 
of the debates in the EACs and the plenary debates in Poland and in the Czech Republic shows a 
different state of affairs in each of the Member States under analysis despite the fact that both 
depict a consensus model with executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets as opposed to 
the Westminster model characterized by concentration of executive power in one-party and the 
government dominant vis-à-vis the parliament.
114
  
In the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna and the Senát, the position of the government and of the 
parliament with regard to subsidiarity tends to be the same.
115
 However in Poland, the chambers 
disagreed with the government on a number of occasions. Specifically, this was the case in the 
Sejm with regard to the Commission proposal on Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base;
116
 
on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use,
117
 on the management of copyrights in 
                                                 
113
 F C Mayer, ‘Competences-Reloaded-The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU and the New European 
Constitution’  3 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2005) 493, 502. In addition, de Wilde argues that 
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Alleviate the Democratic Deficit’ OPAL Online Paper Series <http://www.opal-
europe.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=108> at 9. 
114
 A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, Government Forms in Thirty-Six Countries (Yale University Press 2012). 
See also the chapter by Cygan in this Volume who points out the relatively more important ministerial 
accountability in comparison to the EWM.  
115
 For Poslanecká sněmovna: Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, EAC meeting of 6.12.2012; Minister of 
Agriculture Czech, EAC meeting of 24.01.2013; For Senát: See Minister of Interior, Stenographic record of 23rd 
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reasoned opinion itself on COM (2010) 379; Minister of Justice Czech Parliament, the Senát 9th term Stenographic 
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Parliament, the Senát 9
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 term Stenographic record  of the 25th meeting of the Senát (the first day of the meeting - 
Oct. 1, 2014). 
116
 COM (2011) 121. According to the government the directive will resolve transparency issues. See Pełny zapis 
przebiegu posiedzenia Komisji do Spraw Unii Europejskiej, 26.09.2012, p. 5. 
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 COM (2012) 369. Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 23. Posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 10.10.2012, 
p. 8.  
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musical works.
118
 Both the Sejm’s and the Senat’s position differed from that of the government 
regarding the issuing of the reasoned opinion on the ‘Women on Boards’ proposal.119 In addition, 
for a number of early Commission proposals the government did not deliver any opinion on 
subsidiarity either in the proceedings before the Sejm or the Senat.
120
 The Polish government 
itself gave a plausible explanation of the different views on subsidiarity. Specifically, during the 
Sejm debate on the Commission regulation on clinical trials on medicinal products for human 
use, the representative of the government justified the support for the draft proposal by stating 
that ‘[the government] does not want to be seen as blocking all the [EU] initiatives.’121 This 
explanation might apply also to the other cases of disagreement between the government and 
parliament on issuing a reasoned opinion.
122
 Nonetheless, it also underlines that the Polish 
parliament, and especially the Sejm, has gained some independence under the EWM.  
In contrast to that, in the Czech Republic, the views of the government and the chambers 
overlapped in all cases where the reasoned opinion was issued.
123
 Interestingly, this was the case 
also with regard to the EPPO and Eurojust reform proposals, when the Social Democrats had the 
majority in the Senát while the government was conservative.
124
  
Unanimity on issuing the reasoned opinions 
Second, this chapter studies whether the decision to conduct a subsidiarity review through the 
EWM echoes divisions between the parliamentary majority (coalition) and the minority 
(opposition) or whether issuing a reasoned opinion is a unanimous decision. 
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During the votes on the reasoned opinions in the EAC of the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, the 
deputies took the resolution to issue a reasoned opinion on the third country seasonal workers 
proposal and on the tobacco products directive unanimously (with some of the members 
abstaining),
125
 while there was more contestation on ‘Women on Boards.’126 The analysis of 
voting procedures on the reasoned opinions in the Czech Senát indicates that there is rather a 
consensus among the senators that the reasoned opinion should be put forward to the 
Commission. More specifically, the parties on both sides of the political spectrum broadly 
accepted the reasoned opinions.
127
 One explanation of this situation could be that EU issues are 
no longer as divisive as before accession and are nowadays more technical than strategic.
128
 
In the same vein, a noticeable convergence between the coalition and opposition can be found in 
both the Sejm and the Senat.
129
 In principle, when the governing coalition proposes a reasoned 
opinion, it passes through the chambers. In contrast, it is harder for the parliamentary opposition 
to succeed in the subsidiarity review. For example, the reasoned opinion sponsored by one of the 
opposition parties (PiS) regarding the Commission proposal for the programme FISCUS 
supporting cooperation between tax and customs authorities of the Member States failed to get 
sufficient support.
130
 
Although there seems to be a major convergence of views between the political parties with 
regard to subsidiarity violations regardless of the fragmentation of the domestic party system, 
visibly some cases display the right-left cleavage.
131
 The party positions on specific policy issues 
tend to play a role in the question whether to issue a reasoned opinion in the lower chambers of 
the member states under analysis.
132
 In consequence, the parliamentarians follow their general 
party programme, rather than the specific party stance on EU affairs.  
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In the first example, in the Sejm, the Democratic Left Alliance, a party in favour of the 
introduction of partnerships into the Polish legal order, did not support the reasoned opinion on 
the Commission proposal on the property consequences of registered partnerships with an 
objective to enable management and division of property of such couples. The party argued that 
‘it is in line with the plans or program of the SLD that supports the legalisation of partnerships in 
Poland.’133 The second instance of a right-left division took place in the Sejm and in the Czech 
Poslanecká sněmovna. On the Polish side, the majority of the governing coalition and the 
conservative MPs of the parliamentary opposition (PiS, SP) supported the reasoned opinion, 
against the Commission’s proposal introducing gender quotas on non-executive boards of 
companies. In contrast, the liberal opposition (SLD, Ruch Palikota) resisted the issuing of a 
reasoned opinion in this case, highlighting the need for gender equality on boards and the 
absence of national measures in this respect.
134
 Interestingly, the case of the ‘Women on boards’ 
proposal was also the only case showing a lack of unanimity in the Czech parliament, beyond the 
cases where some MPs and senators abstained.
135
 The Social Democrats and the communist 
party MPs who welcomed the Commission proposal underlined the existing inequalities between 
men and women in labour relations and remuneration in the Czech Republic.
136
 
Finally, it has to be emphasized that the cleavages are less visible in the Senates of the 
parliaments under analysis. This might be connected to the higher levels of politicization of the 
lower chambers relative to the upper chambers.  
Assessment 
In summary, the comparison between the Polish and Czech parliaments along the lines of the 
‘most similar cases’ model suggests several plausible explanations (both structural and 
procedural) for the different approaches they adopt in their scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle, 
without identifying a strong single causal mechanism.  
First, a structural argument have been made that the particular activity of the Czech Senát, the 
extensive participation in the ‘Barroso initiative,’ and more recently the participation in the first 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘Political Motivation and Institutional Capacity: Assessing National Parliaments’ Incentives to Participate in the 
Early Warning System’ OPAL Online Paper Series No. 15/2013 at 17. Although the reasoned opinions described in 
this chapter have been issued and hence the cleavage did not impact on the number of issued reasoned opinions, the 
analysis of the parliamentary debates shows that arguments along right-left division are in fact present in the debates 
of EU legislative proposals. 
133
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 Poslanecká sněmovna, EAC meeting of 6.12.2012, Vote 7-2-3 (2 disagreed, 3 abstained). 
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‘green card’, is due to the relative weakness of that chamber in the parliamentary system, which 
the Senát aims to counter by establishing a strong profile on EU affairs.
137
 In the same vein, the 
upper chambers in other examples of asymmetric bicameralism discussed in this volume, such as 
the French Sénat, see the EWM as an avenue to enhance its role in the national system.
138
 In 
addition, even in the symmetric Italian bicameralism the Senato takes a more active role both 
under the EWM and in the ‘Barroso initiative’ in the face of possible constitutional reforms 
diminishing its role and a more general trend of strengthening of the upper chambers by the 
Lisbon Treaty reforms.
139
 Whilst all these explanations are plausible, it is worth noting that the 
Polish Senat is subject to a similar asymmetry as the Czech and French upper chambers and 
nonetheless chooses to pursue a different, more balanced route. Thus, the Czech and other 
examples do not alone warrant inference of causality. 
A second group of arguments focuses on the political stance of parties in power towards 
European integration, pointing out that a particularly Europhile party may prefer to pursue 
dialogue through the ‘Barroso initiative’ over a possible confrontation with the Commission 
through formally issued reasoned opinions. In particular, Hrabálek and Strelkov argue that the 
Czech Social Democratic party may want to protect its credibility at EU level.
140
 Visibly, in the 
Czech lower chamber, all the reasoned opinions to date have been issued by the governing 
conservative coalition. In addition, the perception of the EWM as a Eurosceptic tool is evident 
also in France (low number of reasoned opinions and high number of ‘Barroso initiative’ 
opinions in the pro-European French Assemblée nationale in contrast to the traditionally more 
Eurosceptic Sénat).
141 A similar analysis of pro-European behaviour can be conducted for the 
parties in power in Poland and, however, offer different results. Since 2007 the Civic Platform, 
which is seen as a Europe-friendly party, has controlled both houses of parliament, but this 
situation did not prevent it from actively making its case through issuing reasoned options. The 
approach taken by the EU-friendly parliamentary majority might hence not be decisive for the 
participation in the EWM. 
Third, procedural aspects of the EWM may play a crucial role in different levels of participation 
of parliaments: the national scrutiny procedures for the EWM and the eight-week constraint for 
submission of the reasoned opinions. Since the EWM procedures at the national level are similar 
in the Czech and the Polish chambers (centralised and mixed) this aspect seems not to play a role 
for their activity.
142
 Due to the cycles of parliamentary work and not very frequent EAC’s 
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meetings the participation in the EWM might be impaired.
143
 For example, the Czech Senát 
adopted a reasoned opinion on the right to strike proposal and on the proposal for recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions which however were not submitted within the eight weeks 
period.
144
 In contrast the ‘Barroso political dialogue’ allows for a flexible submission of 
contributions. The eight-week deadline in the EWM seems less problematic for the Polish 
parliament. The EAC committees meet regularly, in addition, the reasoned opinions are voted on 
in the plenary and an evident case where the reasoned opinion was not agreed to was due to the 
lack of support rather than lack of time. Yet, the wish to increase the time available for drafting 
the reasoned opinions has also been voiced by the Polish parliament.
145
  
Conclusion 
This chapter presented the functioning of the EWM in the Czech Republic and in Poland. In 
these two relatively recent new EU Member States the position of the parliament in the 
constitutional system is similar, since they represent the unequal bicameralism model. The 
powers of the legislatures in the Czech Republic and in Poland in EU affairs were also 
strengthened with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Accordingly, the Czech and the 
Polish chambers rely to a large extent on the EACs for the subsidiarity scrutiny. Due to these 
similarities, the Czech and the Polish parliaments could be perceived as two peas in a pod. 
Surprisingly, their activity under the EWM is very different. The Polish Sejm and the Senat have 
issued around a dozen of reasoned opinions each, while their Czech counterparts remained rather 
quiet in this procedure. Moreover, the Czech Senát relied much more on the ‘Barroso initiative’ 
becoming one of the most active parliaments EU-wide in this respect. The aim of this chapter 
was hence to explore the possible reasons for this discrepancy. 
The chapter has first studied the content of the reasoned opinions that the Czech and the Polish 
parliaments issued since the entry into force under the second Barroso Commission which 
covered the period since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty until December 2014. The 
reasoned opinions show that both parliaments apply a rather generous reading of the EWM under 
Protocol No. 2. They assess the material and procedural aspects of the subsidiarity principle, in 
addition to the assessment of the legal basis and proportionality of Commission proposals. 
Moreover, the Polish parliament’s focus is also on the legal basis of proposals and conferrals of 
the delegated and implementing power to the Commission while the Czech parliament 
emphasised the fundamental rights questions raised by the proposed draft acts. 
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The analysis of the debates and of the voting on the reasoned opinions in the Czech and Polish 
parliaments has offered some more insights in the application of the EWM in both Member 
States. In Poland and in the Czech Republic, the political parties usually vote unanimously that a 
reasoned opinion should be issued. However, some right-left political cleavages are visible in the 
debates under the EWM. The in-depth study of the EWM in Poland and the Czech Republic 
shows also that beyond the unequal number of the reasoned opinions issued by the chambers, 
there is a visible difference in the relationship vis-à-vis the government. Specifically, in a 
number of cases the Polish Sejm has issued a reasoned opinion although the government did not 
establish a subsidiarity violation by the Commission proposals at stake. It was hence argued that 
the chamber became more independent from the government under the EWM than the Senat or 
the Czech chambers. 
Finally, the chapter attempted to give some explanation to the dissimilar application of the 
subsidiarity scrutiny in the two ‘most similar cases’. First, the argument that the Czech Senát has 
built a strong profile in the ‘Barroso initiative’ due to its generally rather limited competences in 
the Czech bicameralism was rejected since the Polish Senat has the same position as its Czech 
counterpart and did not take a matching approach under the EWM. Second, the case that a pro-
European stance of political parties bars the parliament from issuing a reasoned opinion does not 
offer an explanation for the differentiated functioning of the EWM in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. Visibly, the Polish Euro-friendly coalition parliament, in contrast to the Czech 
parliament, did not limit its participation under the EWM. Lastly, the concerns of the parliaments 
with the eight-week limit for submitting the reasoned opinions and its interplay with the agenda 
of the parliament might offer some, however, probably not the only explanation to the activity of 
the EWM in Poland and the Czech Republic. 
